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This article puts forth a hypothesis and a challenge. The
hypothesis: structural change in the international economy
and in the management of public policy has brought about
changes in economic performance, affected employment,
poverty, and equity and resulted in greater insecurity and
uncertainty. The challenge: coping with this insecurity and
uncertainty despite public policy’s abandonment of its
historical role and the lack of success thus far of the new
approaches. This study points to the greater vulnerability
today stemming from the labour market as well as
asymmetries in trends in poverty and equity and examines
how to address the inevitable social consequences of
instability. It also proposes how to go about managing the
instability that comes from the international sphere; adjusting
macroeconomic policy to lessen the effects of the cycle;
reconciling the need for labour flexibility with the protection
required to cope with greater vulnerability; protecting those
who are most vulnerable; and moving towards universal
social security coverage.
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The purpose of this article is to analyse the linkages
between macroeconomic policies, poverty and equity.
I intend to describe the context in which these
linkages are now emerging and to identify the policies
that may prove most useful as well as to lay out what
is known about the appropriateness of direct policies
aimed at dealing with employment and poverty issues.
In particular, I will examine the effects of the greater
risk stemming from operating in a more open and
interconnected international economy and how that
situation is being addressed so as to avoid the negative
effects that it may have for the most vulnerable
groups.
This is an initial overview that may lead to
subsequent research, both of concepts and of specific
country situations.
My basic assumption is that for two decades Latin
America, like other developing regions, has been
affected by a worldwide paradigm shift involving a
structural transformation in the international economy
and in the management of economic policy. This
structural transformation has also stemmed from the
ideological change brought about by the collapse of
real socialisms and from the pre-existing diversity of
approaches.
This mutation has entailed a different type of
economic functioning and social consequences
characterized by greater insecurity, and its main
manifestation has been in employment, as well as in
levels of poverty and equity. Today Latin America is a
less secure region socially and economically; this
introduces greater uncertainty and generates tension that
affects individuals, families and society as a whole.
This article first addresses the structural context and
its characteristics. Second, it addresses prevailing
macroeconomic policy and its linkages with the
international context. Third, it identifies new
developments in employment, poverty and equity.
Subsequently, it explores policies in five dimensions. The
first, very briefly, addresses ways to diminish the effects
of the instability generated in the international economy.
The second concerns how to prevent risk and thereby
reduce its impact at the macroeconomic level. The third
regards labour and employment policies that would allow
risk to be addressed, thereby preventing, insuring against
or compensating for its effects. The fourth is related to
social policies. The fifth addresses some of the effects
on social cohesion. Finally, I will suggest some
components of an agenda for dealing with risk and





This section describes international and national structural
changes, and, in particular, identifies three processes:
globalization, privatization and liberalization (Tokman,
2001). These processes have resulted in a different global
economy and have laid down new rules of operation for
national policies, in addition to, in fact, limiting available
options. There is less autonomy for designing policies at
the national level and options have become more restricted.
This new form of operating is characterized, in
addition, by greater instability and its more rapid
transmission. A more integrated global economy, with
a greater importance for financial issues in a context of
rapid change in information technology, is making
instantaneous the transmission process of both benefits
and costs.
A version of this article was presented at the seminar “Política
macroeconómica y vulnerabilidad social” (Santiago, Chile, 26 and
27 November 2002), in the framework of a project co-funded by the
United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs and the
governments of Germany and France. The author is grateful for the
comments he received at that meeting and, especially, to Andras
Uthoff and Daniel Titelman, for their suggestions for the different
versions of this text.
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The macroeconomic regime under which countries
operate is changing. Employment is more closely linked
with external demand, and the ability to expand
domestic demand or raise wages above productivity
gains is limited, either by the need to finance them or
by the impossibility of transferring them to prices
without affecting competitiveness.
Available empirical evidence analysed by the
World Bank (De Ferranti, Perry and others, 2000) shows
that in Latin America long-term instability, as gauged
by the volatility of gross domestic product, is twice that
of industrialized countries and higher than that of the
countries of South-Eeast Asia. And instability in
consumption is three times that of developed countries
and is surpassed only by the countries of sub-Saharan
Africa.
Moreover, unlike in industrialized countries,
consumption volatility surpasses output volatility,
which may be attributable to the lesser capacity to
attenuate the effects of the cycle because of the
existence of fewer assets, more limited possibilities of
indebtedness and the less effective use of
countercyclical policies.
It has also been found that the highest volatility
was seen in the 1980s, whereas volatility in the 1990s
was even lower than in the 1970s. This has led to the
interpretation that increased instability and insecurity
stemming from volatility was a short-lived episode—
which does not preclude the need to introduce policies
to reduce these phenomena. Nevertheless, a different
reading of the same information allows us to arrive at
distinct conclusions. First, the evolution of the 1990s
does not include the effect of the Asian crisis after 1998.
According to ECLAC (2000a), Latin America’s average
growth rate decreased from 3.8% from 1991 to 1997 to
1% from 1998 to 1999, and the variation coefficient
increased by 50%, if we consider the entire decade,
including the effects of the crisis. Second, although
volatility was lower in the 1990s than in the 1980s and
slightly lower than in the 1970s, we should qualify the
previous statement by noting that in Latin America
volatility evolved differently than in the industrialized
countries. The differential in GDP volatility increased
by a factor of 2.5 in the 1980s and decreased by a factor
of 1.7 in the 1990s, although still remaining above the
level seen in the 1970s. Differences in consumption
increased, and were 3.3 times higher than in
industrialized countries, in comparison with a factor of
2.4 and 3.1 in the 1970s and 1980s, respectively.
Instability was high and was not clearly decreasing,
which generated insecurity, insofar as it was transmitted
through the labour market to employment, income and
wages. I will return to these effects below.
In addition, we should stress three issues stemming
from the processes of change in the aforementioned
economic context. Globalization puts a premium on the
search for international competitiveness and favours the
adoption of defensive strategies for competing —through
the reduction of costs, particularly labour costs, and
greater flexibility in work processes— in markets with
fluctuating demand. Privatization places a greater
responsability for job creation on the private sector.
This, in turn, requires closer linkages between economic
and social policies, since —although economic
incentives and stability are requirements for investment
and growth— social legitimation and a perception of
fair treatment are necessary for the sustainability of
policies and the stability of the rules of the game.
Liberalization means assigning greater importance to
the role of markets as resource allocators and favours
reduced government intervention. Although this may
result in greater economic efficiency, it often leads to




The new macroeconomic regime and the policies guided
by the different versions of the Washington Consensus
tend to magnify vulnerability and to aggravate the
instability and insecurity created by the transfer of real
and financial volatility. Moreover, these policies tend
to be procyclical, thus exacerbating instability, and fail
to play the role of stabilizers.
As is noted by ECLAC (2000b), Keynesian stability,
which combined internal equilibrium (stable growth,
low inflation and near full employment) with external
82 C E P A L  R E V I E W  8 1  •  D E C E M B E R  2 0 0 3
TOWARDS AN INTEGRATED VIS ION FOR DEALING WITH INSTABIL ITY AND RISK •  V ÍCTOR E.  TOKMAN
equilibrium (sustainability of the balance of payments),
has given way to a focus on external macroeconomic
equilibrium and inflation and, moreover, to the
association of stability with low fiscal deficits and stable
exchange rates. Nevertheless, these variables are not
necessarily indicative of more stable growth or full
employment.
This approach was introduced to Latin America in
the 1980s and guided the process of economic reforms
adopted to address the debt crisis. It stressed trade
liberalization, privatization and deregulation, and the
elements of this approach were known as the
Washington Consensus, because they constituted the
prescriptions favoured by the Bretton Woods financial
institutions, based in Washington, D.C. The original
version of the Consensus sought, above all, to re-establish
macroeconomic equilibria through fiscal discipline; the
rechannelling of government expenditure; tax reform;
trade and financial liberalization; competitive, unified
exchange rates; an opening to foreign investment;
privatization; deregulation; and security of property
rights.
It was not until the 1990s that, because of the
unsatisfactory results, the Consensus was expanded to
include a second generation of reforms that emphasized
governance and sought to strengthen the State’s
capacity. Hence, the original list was expanded to
include legal and political reforms, regulatory
institutions, anti-corruption efforts, labour-market
flexibility, financial rules and codes, the “prudent”
opening of the capital account, social safety nets and
poverty reduction (Rodrik, 2001; Williamson, 1998).
The set of policies included in the different
versions of the Consensus has tended to worsen real
macroeconomic instability. Moreover, it has generally
accentuated the business cycle and acted procyclically.
This has been expressed in fiscal as well as monetary
and credit policies, and in financial and exchange-rate
policies. Tax receipts and fiscal spending evolve hand-
in-hand with the cycle insofar as they expand when
growth picks up and contract during recessions. The
same occurs with monetary and credit policy, as the
greater inflow of foreign capital during the growth
phase allows private spending to increase and lowers
the cost of credit; further, in the absence of prudent
management, financial agents tend to increase the risk
of their investments and to inflate the prices of the
assets that back their loans. Financial “bubbles” often
burst when, in the cyclical downturn, foreign capital
changes direction, precipitating an inordinately deep
contraction.
Instability, magnified by procyclical policies,
entails costs resulting from greater uncertainty and leads
to the underutilization of capacity together with
microeconomic behaviour that discourages productive
investment. This, in turn, exacts social costs of
unemployment, poverty and income distribution
because of the asymmetrical behaviour of the cycle:
indicators contract quickly during a recession and are
slow to react during the recovery.
IV
New developments
I will examine three areas where there have been new
developments, stemming from the prevailing
environment of instability: employment, poverty and
income distribution.
It is through these mechanisms that volatility tends
to spread, turning into economic insecurity and
generating uncertainty among the population. In
employment, three phenomena stand out: i) greater
vulnerability to unemployment, ii) greater instability
stemming from privatization, and iii) a change in the
employment structure, which increases uncertainty
because of the shift from formal to informal work,
privatization and the loss of job security. Lastly, we
must also analyse the volatility and evolution of wages.
Greater vulnerability to unemployment results in
more rapid variations in unemployment in response to
fluctuations in the pace of economic activity, facilitated
by labour reforms that have expanded the grounds for
dismissing workers and reduced companies’ adjustment
times. Similarly, greater volatility has been
accompanied by asymmetries that suggest a faster
adjustment to contraction than to recovery, which in
situations of recurrent short-term crises has meant rising
unemployment rates that are stable at the higher level.
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The average unemployment rate for the region has
climbed steadily, rising —according to World Bank
data— from 6.6% in the 1970s to 7.6% in the 1980s
and 7.9% in the 1990s, without taking into account the
effect of the crises of 1998-1999. Similarly,
International Labour Organization (ILO) data show the
same trend, with average rates rising from around 4%
between 1950 and 1970 to approximately 7% during
the 1980s and 1990s (Tokman and García, 1981; ILO,
2002).
This trend can be observed more clearly in figure 1,
which includes unemployment and GDP growth rates
between 1980 and 2002. In the 1980s, the debt crisis
caused unemployment to rise from 1983 to 1985,
reaching an average rate of 8.4%. Thereafter, there
was a gradual reduction until 1992, by when it had
declined to between 5% and 6%. Subsequently, the
unemployment rate once again began to rise, despite
high GDP growth, and was stoked by three outbreaks of
crisis in the 1990s: the “tequila” effect in 1995, the
“Asian crisis” in 1998-1999, and the current crisis, in
2001 and 2002. Although the economic downturn
brought about by the 1980s debt crisis was much more
severe than that of any of the crises of the 1990s,
unemployment rose much more quickly in the 1990s
and tended to stabilize at higher levels following the
crises, increasing from 7.9% to 8.9%, and then to the
current rate of 9.3%.
The greater vulnerability to unemployment is partly
related to the success in stabilizing prices, since low
inflation rates in the 1990s made real wages more
downwardly inflexible and shifted the burden of
adjustment to employment. In addition, this was
encouraged by the change in regulations governing
dismissals and the introduction of more flexible labour
contracts. Similarly, labour turnover is higher than in
the countries of the Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD), where 24.5% of
all job holders have less than two years’ seniority,
compared with 38.1% in Latin America. The same is
true of average job retention, which in the OECD is 10.5
years, in contrast with 7.6 years in Latin America. The
higher unemployment propensity transfers instability
to workers and their families and contributes to
uncertainty not only among those who are directly
affected but, according to available surveys, among a
larger group, because of the fear the employed have of
losing their job.
The second factor that contributes to greater
instability is privatization. The transfer of job creation
from the public to the private sector entails a change in
the type of jobs. The protected, stable public-sector
positions have been replaced with less permanent and
protected positions. This does not necessarily mean
lower wages, but it does imply a need to adapt to higher
turnover in the labour market.
The public sector’s share of non-farm employment
contracted from 15.5% to 13.4% between 1990 and
2001. From a longer-term perspective, this indicates
that the public sector did not contribute to net job
FIGURE 1
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creation in the 1990s, whereas in the 1980s it created
15 of every 100 new jobs. Part of the reduction in
government employment translated into higher
unemployment and the rest into private-sector
employment. Some persons found work in modern
sectors, but most moved into informal activities in
microenterprises or into own-account employment.
Government jobs have been —and in most countries
continue to be— characterized by a statutory regime
with contractual job security and full social protection,
which tends to partly compensate for wages lower than
those in the private sector. The transfer towards the
private sector and the State’s smaller role as an
employer, which has differential effects on older groups,
in the first case, and on younger groups, in the second,
means a loss of protection for those who find work.
Net income will not necessarily be lower, but income
and employment volatility will be higher. Hence,
instability and uncertainty increase.
The third phenomenon affects the structure of
employment and is the result of the shift from formal
to informal work, the shift of employment from goods-
producing sectors to services, and the loss of protection.
This increased share of employment in the informal
sector means that a significant and growing proportion
of new jobs are created in this sector. Between 1990
and 2001, two of every three jobs were generated in
the informal sector, whose share of non-farm
employment increased from 42.8% to 46.3% in that
period. Forty-seven of every 100 new informal positions
were non-professional, own-account employment or
corresponded to unpaid family work; 34 were created
by microenterprises; and the rest (19) corresponded to
domestic service.
Employment in the services sector also grew. The
proportion of job holders in services grew from 71.2%
to 74.6% of non-farm employees between 1990 and
2001. Ninety-six of every 100 new jobs during this
period were generated in the services sector. More than
half (54%) of the new jobs were created in community
and personal services, 25.4% in commerce and 6.6%
in transportation. Lastly, the third process was the loss
of protection, as the share of workers without contracts
or with temporary contracts that did not include access
to labour and social protection increased. Forty-three
of every 100 new jobs created did not offer access to
social security services.
These three processes are not independent. On the
contrary: they overlap, since informal employment is
concentrated in services and results in a lack of
protection. Services, in turn, are concentrated in low-
productivity activities because services associated with
globalization and modernization, although increasingly
important, are still not significant. The lack of protection
overlaps with the first two processes. Together, they
produce greater instability and uncertainty by increasing
FIGURE 2







Latin America: Creation of wage-earning jobs
paying social security contributions, 1990-2001
(Percentages)
FIGURE 3
Latin America: Job creation by branch of
economic activity, 1990-2001
(Percentages)
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the relative importance of jobs of shorter duration and
with less labour and social protection.
Lastly, we will consider wage volatility to
determine if it contributed to increasing uncertainty.
An examination of the evolution of real wages over the
last three decades shows that average volatility in Latin
America in the 1980s was twice that of the 1970s.
Nevertheless, in the 1990s wage volatility returned to
levels similar to those of the 1970s (De Ferranti, Perry
and others, 2000). To a large degree this is explained
by the significant, widespread reduction of inflation
rates from 1990 to 1999. In particular, volatility declined
significantly in countries that went from very high
inflation rates (including some with hyperinflation) to
moderate or low rates, such as Argentina, Bolivia, Chile,
Brazil and Peru. Still, the lower volatility of real wages
translated into greater downward inflexibility and
transferred the heaviest burden of the adjustment to
employment, with the consequent increase in
unemployment.
The volatility of real wages, however, does not
entirely explain the behaviour of employment income,
because of limitations in the scope of the available
information, as well as conceptual limitations. Wage
calculations do not generally include income from
employment at small enterprises or earned by workers
without contracts or own-account workers. As noted
above, in these categories the share of employment has
increased, and income from this type of employment is
generally less stable than are wages. Their inclusion
might modify existing conclusions. Partial information
presented by ECLAC (2000a) shows that the income
differences between skilled and non-skilled workers
increased in the 1990s. Between 1990 and 1997 the
gap between the labour income of skilled workers and
wages in the formal sector increased 24%, and the
disparity between the income of skilled workers and
wages in informal enterprises rose 28%. In 1997, wages
of skilled workers were 2.3 times higher than those of
workers in the formal sector and 3.6 higher than those
in the informal sector.
Disparities in average wages between the formal
and informal sectors increased by 10% in the same
period, and wages in the formal sector were 2.1 times
higher than those in the informal sector. Although the
wage disparities between the two sectors did not change
significantly in the 1990s, wages in the formal sector
were 1.5 times higher than those in the informal sector.
The disparity between the formal and informal sectors
tended to increase in the countries that grew the fastest
and to decrease in countries in which the average
income of the urban employed fell, particularly in
countries where wages contracted more in the formal
sector than in the informal sector. In countries with low
growth, the maintenance or worsening of inequality
resulted less from an increase in this disparity than from
rising unemployment, declining wages and the greater
capacity of the highest-income groups to defend their
share of total income.
The second issue related to instability is poverty.
Two observations, among others, are in order. First,
poverty has followed the variations of the cycle,
increasing in the 1980s, during the downturn, and
declining in the 1990s, during the recovery, but without
returning to initial levels. The percentage of households
below the poverty line fell between 1990 and 1999 from
41% to 35.3%, still remaining above the 34.7% recorded
in 1980. The percentage of indigent decreased from
17.7% to 13.9% in the same period, an improvement
on the level of 15% recorded in 1980. The number of
poor increased by around 11 million, even as the number
of indigent fell by 4 million (ECLAC, 2001a). Instability
generated not only more poor powerty, but new powerty
as well.
Labour-market income is very important for
households, accounting for approximately 80% of their
total income. Transfers represent only 13%. In addition,
heads of household continue to contribute around 70%
of household income, although the contributions of
other household members have risen, particularly those
of women (ECLAC, 2002). This indicates that the labour
market is the main transmitter of instability, while social
policies, though important, play a limited role. It also
attests to the importance of the incorporation of new
income earners as a factor for households to overcome
poverty, which, in turn, depends on employment and
income opportunities.
The second observation refers to the impact of
crises on the poor. Although it is proven that the effect
of growth (or the lack thereof) on the poor is similar to
its effect on average income earners, the intensity of
crises has a differential effect, since crises of a greater
magnitude have a greater impact on the poor (De
Ferranti, Perry and others, 2000). This is because the
poor have more limited defence mechanisms, which
forces them to reduce their consumption levels or
liquidate assets to cope with the longest or most intense
crises.
Three observations are in order on the third area,
income distribution. First, unlike poverty, income
distribution has proven to be asymmetrical and less
elastic in relation to changes in growth. On the one hand,
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it worsens during crises but does not improve during
the recovery. From 1960 to 1980, income concentration
as measured by the Gini coefficient had declined from
0.53 to 0.50 on average for 13 countries of Latin
America. Starting in 1980, the coefficient rose, to 0.53
in 1990 and to 0.54 around 1999. Moreover, recovery
tends to benefit the highest income groups the most.
Whereas the income of the wealthiest decile doubled
between 1980 and 2000, that of the poorest 40%
remained constant (ILO, 2002). Between 60% and 90%
of inequality can be explained by the high share of
income received by the top decile (IDB, 1999).
Consequently, over time growth has become less
effective as an instrument to reduce poverty. In the
1960s, poverty decreased 0.98% for each additional
percentage point of growth; in the 1970s, it decreased
0.69%; and in the 1990s it declined 0.12% (ILO, 2002).
Unlike what occurred with poverty, in almost no country
of the region did the conditions of inequality improve
in the 1990s. Only Panama and Uruguay showed an
improvement in equity.
The second observation is that middle-income
groups have been affected the most, even more than
the poor. As noted, in countries where income
distribution worsened, the gap between middle-income
groups, on the one hand, and high-income and low-
income groups, on the other, widened more because of
the growth of the top decile than the decline of the
lowest stratum. Indeed, this growing inequality
coincided with a reduction in poverty, except in
Uruguay. The result was a loss of income share by the
middle strata, which garnered a much smaller portion
of the increase in income, due to the worsening
employment situation. The middle strata suffered the
combined effect of the labour market and the change
in social policy. Social policy has increasingly targeted
the poorest, thereby becoming more efficient but at the
expense of the middle groups, given the difficulty of
transferring income from the upper groups to others
(Klein and Tokman, 2000; ECLAC, 2001a).
Lastly, we need to analyse the system’s loss of
social cohesion. Divergent tensions have been
generated by change, but they generally tend to
fragment rather than to unify the social structure.
Tensions are created by changes in occupational
directions and the greater mobility in the labour
market. Some of these directions are upward, but
others are not. Undoubtedly, they are all accompanied
by greater instability. Traditional processes of upward
mobility are also weakened—some, because they have
run their course; others, by changes in direction: in
particular, the urbanization and modernization of the
employment structure. This is also accompanied by
social policy’s reduced levelling capacity; the
narrowing of this capacity has benefited the poorest
but it has had a negative effect on the middle groups.
This holds for the acquisition of public services (which
were once free and are now the object of transactions),
the differentiation in the quality of these services (due
to the effect of privatization of the education and health
sectors), or the cancellation of cross-subsidization
between groups of different income levels and similar
needs (health) (Klein and Tokman, 2000; Tokman
1998).
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In this section, I will review the spaces for intervention
at different levels. The convergence of economic and
ideological approaches has led to a certain determinism
in the acceptance of social results that cause
dissatisfaction because of the greater uncertainty and
the worsening levels of poverty and equity.
This is, in fact, largely the result of the new form
of operation within the context of globalization, which
limits for autonomy and imposes higher penalties
mistakes resulting from the trial-and-error process
inherent in economic policy-making.
Moreover, little attention has been paid to a series
of views that, without becoming an alternative model
of operation, introduce not insignificant nuances in the
use of policy tools. These innovative proposals,
generally coming from academia, have increasingly
penetrated governments and international institutions
within a context of dissatisfaction with the results thus
far obtained.1 Hence, a space conducive to innovation
has opened up.
It is also important to differentiate between
possibilities for intervention according to the objectives
sought. First, there is an attempt to reduce risk through
preventative policies that can be promoted at either the
international or the national level, and, at the national
level, to promote macroeconomic policies as well as
more specific policies in the field of labour regulation.
Moreover, risk can also be dealt with by trying to
mitigate its potential damage through insurance or
social-protection policies. Lastly, when risk becomes
fact those who are affected certainly deserve
compensation through specific measures to provide
them with income or employment or to allow their
productive re-entry into the labour market.
I will address this task on four levels:
— The first refers to managing instability coming
from the international sphere.
— The second deals with the most suitable
macroeconomic policy for mitigating the effects
of external shocks.
— The third relates to labour policies—increasingly
the space for seeking flexibility in response to the
accepted rigidity of macroeconomic policies and
those that operate in the international sphere.
— The fourth examines social policies and, in
particular, protection policies, with a view to
compensating the most vulnerable groups and to
“shielding” programmes essential for future
development.
1. Policies to regulate international fluctuations
External volatility has traditionally been transmitted
through both trade and financing. However, the
lowering of trade barriers and the liberalization of
capital markets have accelerated the spread of instability
and deepened its effects, since its contagion among
countries magnifies the procyclical nature of capital
flows.
Nonetheless, there are risk-insurance and
diversification instruments that allow the intensity of
external shocks to be lessened and, occasionally, their
effects to be distributed over time.
Countries may act preventatively to avoid allowing
economic booms, associated with the entry of significant
amounts of capital, to lead to eventual crises. Prudential
crisis management should be implemented through a
suitable liability policy and by avoiding significant price
disequilibria, particularly in the exchange rate and the
prices of assets. Similarly, a foreign-exchange system
allowing for a certain stability and the flexibility
necessary to adapt to external financial shocks may help
and may also avoid the maintenance of reserves that
serve as “self-insurance” during crises.
Disruptions in the terms of trade are insured against
through hedging and futures transactions and,
fundamentally, through the diversification of the
structure of trade. Such possibilities are, however,
limited in Latin America by the high concentration of
exports in a few products, generally natural resources,
and by the recurring volatility in the prices of those
products.
Capital movements, increasingly important, have
also proven to be a source of volatility and generally
reinforce, rather than mitigate, the intensity of the cycle.
The development of capital markets and the stronger




 Among others, see ECLAC (2000b), Ffrench-Davis (1999),
Krugman (1999) and Stiglitz (2002).
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market might permit the introduction of risk-
diversification instruments scarcely available today in
most Latin American countries. Related to this topic,
the degree of opening of the capital market continues
to be debated, since experiences have been mixed and
regulating capital flows has allowed for a decrease in
short-term fluctuations.
At the international level, an emergency financing
body should be created to serve as the lender of last
resort. This role could be played by the International
Monetary Fund (IMF), through its new Contingency
Credit Line, which makes it possible to deal with
problems stemming from financial contagion and which
has not yet been used by any country. Similarly, the
expansion of resources available through the temporary
issue of special drawing rights would contribute to
providing needed liquidity in times of crisis. Moreover,
given the alternative of insolvency, it would be useful
to have multilateral rules for foreign-debt renegotiation.
Although moratoriums can prove costly, a mechanism
agreed to at this level would allow liquidity and
solvency crises to be addressed and permit private-
sector participation in finding a solution, thereby
distributing the costs and risks in a more balanced
manner between debtors and creditors. Such a
mechanism could complement rather than replace the
provision of emergency funds (ECLAC, 2001b).
In the new globalization context, additional topics
that may require intervention are emerging, less to
diminish fluctuations than to regulate competition
among countries. In particular, labour issues have been
doubly important, as determinants of competitiveness
and because of the effects that increased trade can have
on employment, poverty and equity.
At the multilateral level, the search for a regulation
mechanism to avoid unfair competition or “social
dumping” has made significant headway. The
possibility of linking labour and trade conditions in the
event of a breach of fundamental labour principles and
rights has been abandoned at the multilateral level, at
least temporarily, given the risk of its arbitrary use as a
trade-protection mechanism; and a universal agreement
has been forged at the ILO based on the adoption of a
“common minimum labour standard” of fundamental
rights at the workplace. Every country involved in
international trade has committed to abide by this
agreement (Tokman, 1999 and 2002b).
In addition, a variety of innovative mechanisms
has been introduced in free trade and economic
integration agreements, particularly in Latin America.
Some, such as the Southern Common Market
(Mercosur), have adopted the non-hiring model and
moral sanctions regarding a set of labour rights, thereby
making progress vis-à-vis the multilateral mechanism
on rights coverage with the inclusion of labour
conditions and possible measures to correct violations.
Others, such as the agreements between countries of
the region and those of North America —(the North
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), the United
States-Chile Free Trade Agreement—, incorporate
monetary sanctions, which could lead to the suspension
of the benefits of trade agreements in the event of
recurrent violations of the labour laws in effect in each
country intended to protect workers’ fundamental rights.
2. Macroeconomic policy with a countercyclical
focus
Conventional macroeconomic policies have stressed
maintaining equilibria, even in a markedly more volatile
context. In many cases, this means that the procyclical
nature that policies assume when attempts are made to
achieve equilibrium regardless of the stage of the cycle
is compounded by the loss of autonomy stemming from
greater integration into the international economy. This
often triggers an inordinate contraction, with negative
effects on employment and income.
As noted by Ocampo,2 although macroeconomic
policy has distinct national traits, controlling volatility
is facilitated through the combination of three sets of
policies:
— First, through consistent and flexible
macroeconomic policies that avoid disequilibria in
the most relevant prices and the accumulation of
large debts.
— Second, through a system of regulation and
prudential supervision with a clear countercyclical
focus.
— Lastly, through a “liability policy” to manage the
maturity of the country’s debts.
In particular, for the purposes of this study, we
should stress four important aspects, among others. The
first refers to fiscal policy, which, due to the exclusive
commitment to equilibrium maintenance, is a powerful
tool that intensifies fluctuations. Today, by contrast, it
is increasingly recognized that the management of this
policy must aim to balance the public sector’s structural
position, more than its short-term position, which
2
 See Ocampo (2001) and ECLAC (2000b).
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necessitates incorporating a longer-term perspective of
fundamental parameters (Marcel, Tokman and others,
2001a and 2001b). This allows fiscal policy to serve as
a stabilizer, lessening the danger of increasing
disequilibria when short-term criteria are used.
The second aspect refers to the management of
foreign-exchange policy and its relationship with
monetary policy. In Latin America, particularly before
the Asian crisis, exchange rates have been set, or their
adjustments have been delayed, as a tool for reining in
inflation. The results in this area were successful,
particularly taking into account the high-inflation
tradition of the countries of the region. Exchange-rate
lag or rigidity meant shifting the burden of adjustment
to monetary policy, in a context in which more restrictive
fiscal policies faced greater political obstacles,
particularly after the substantial efforts undertaken to
achieve fiscal equilibrium. This triggered an excessive
rise in interest rates and an inordinate economic
contraction, resulting in higher unemployment.3 The
combination of instruments is difficult to predetermine
and must respond, as indicated, to specific national traits.
Nevertheless, for the instruments to be effective, they
must have an appropriate mixture of flexibility and
credibility.
A third aspect is the redistributive effects of
changes in relative prices. Macroeconomic-policy
decisions affect key prices and create winners and
losers, leading, therefore, to changes in the distribution
not only of income but, also, of assets. Macroeconomic
policies that translate into price stability generally
favour the poorest segments of the population.
However, if authorities resort to a combination of a fixed
or lagging exchange rate with excessively tight fiscal
and monetary policies, that benefit may be offset by
diminished income and well-being stemming from
higher unemployment and lower social spending. In
addition, real wages turn downwardly inflexible in
response to successful efforts to control inflation,
because wage changes require to be affected nominal
wages. The labour-market adjustment consequently
tends to be one of quantity more than of price, therefore
bringing higher unemployment with changes in income
distribution between insiders and outsiders.
A fourth aspect is related to the positive correlation
that exists —according to Rodrik (1998)— between
openness and the size of government, as measured by
government spending. Contrary to expectations,
openness is accompanied by more market, but also by
more government, suggesting a complementarity
between the two. The cause appears to lie in the need
to provide social security in countries whose degree of
openness makes them more exposed to risk and
therefore creates a greater need to mitigate it. This
conclusion, based on empirical evidence compared
across countries, is also supported by specific examples
of changes in the degree of integration into the global
economy accompanied by higher government spending,
particularly in social compensation programmes.
This occurred in the smaller European countries
(Austria, the Netherlands and Sweden) that
complemented trade liberalization with investment
programmes, incomes policies, subsidies and transfers.
The same occurred in Spain in 1986, before its entry
into the European Union, and in Chile, in 1990,
following the Pinochet military government. In the
United States, as well, programmes were introduced
that raised unemployment benefits and provided
subsidies to train and relocate workers displaced by
imports as a consequence of multilateral liberalization
in the framework of the General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade (GATT) or, more recently, NAFTA. Moreover,
in the past, not only was the growth of the welfare state
in Europe accompanied by a period of rapid economic
growth, but the two processes mutually reinforced one
another, because of the stabilizing effect of social
transfers during the cycle and social security’s role in
helping workers adjust to economic change.
3. Microeconomic policies for innovation and
growth
The proper management of macroeconomic policy,
particularly with a countercyclical focus during downturns,
is a necessary but insufficient condition for ensuring the
return to growth and its permanence over time. And
sustained growth is a requirement for creating jobs and
reducing poverty. Consequently, microeconomic
policies must be adopted that promote innovation,
learning and complementaries among sectors so as to
raise productivity, create economies of scale and
3
 Between 1993 and 2001, the real effective exchange rate for imports
to Latin America appreciated by an average of 8%, whereas annual
inflation declined from close to 900% to 6% between 1993 and 2001.
In the meantime, real annual interest rates rose to 21% in 1998.
Only since late 1998, and particularly in Brazil in 1999, have
corrections begun to be made to foreign-exchange policy and has
devaluation allowed interest rates to be adjusted downward. The
magnitude of the disequilibrium is illustrated by the cases of
Argentina and Brazil, countries in which real lending rates reached
28% and 48%, respectively, between 2001 and 2002 (ECLAC, 2002).
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reinforce the system’s ability to compete (Katz and
Cimoli, 2001; ECLAC 2000b).
I will reflect on two important issues related to this
topic. The first is the need to invest in providing the
workforce with know-how and skills. There has been a
process of industrial restructuring accompanied by
increased concentration; in the first stage, it has
translated into the destruction of jobs but subsequently
it has allowed productivity levels to recover through
the incorporation of workers with a higher level of
expertise. However, labour and human-resources
policies have lagged behind, insofar as they were
envisioned for an initial phase of restructuring with
declining employment and do not provide workers with
the skills required for the technology incorporated in a
subsequent stage. Thus, a discrepancy arises between
the carrying out of the adjustment and the creation of
the conditions of stability needed to encourage
investment in know-how. I will return to this in the next
section.
The second issue concerns small enterprises, which
provide a high proportion of employment but at the
same time account for the lowest levels of protection
and job security. Their behaviour in the cycle, contrary
to what occurs with larger enterprises, is
countercyclical; however, the manner in which their
offsetting role in downturns is financed affects their
ability to contribute to the recovery. The presence of
less formalized labour relations and of an often-
paternalistic management style frequently leads to the
overprotection of employment in small enterprises.
Small enterprises thus contribute to offsetting the
negative effect of recession. However, once the crisis
has passed, their future depends on how they finance
worker retention. If, as is usually the case, they resort
to high-cost indebtedness,4 their net worth and financial
situation will affect their capacity to recover; in many
cases this will cause enterprises to close. It is during
this period, when the rate of growth and job creation of
larger companies begins to recover, that small
enterprises eliminate jobs. This behaviour, which affects
unemployment, tends to transfer greater risk to workers
and employers who lack suitable social or insurance
protection systems allowing them to remain shielded
during the downturn of the business cycle.
4. Labour policies: between labour stability and
unemployment protection
Labour policies may be analysed from two standpoints:
first, as an important determinant of international
competitiveness, and, second, with regard to direct
policies for insuring against the risk of unemployment.
Regarding the first issue, the prevailing approach
has stressed the search for flexibility and the reduction
of costs, particularly labour costs, as ways to raise
competitiveness (Tokman, 2001). The labour policies
currently in effect in most countries were designed to
provide a relatively high level of employment stability.
Labour legislation enacted regulations to diminish the
risk of dismissal and protected workers’ jobs; the
rationale for such legislation was mainly based on the
need to provide protection and create a substitute for
insurance, which markets could not furnish. The cost
of these regulations has been greater rigidity and the
higher cost of dismissals. Legislation was adapted to
existing economic conditions, but it gradually become
inadequate for the present-day world, characterized by
stronger macroeconomic fluctuations, high
unemployment, rapid structural change, great
uncertainty and the increasing heterogeneity of
occupations and workers.
This explains the growing popularity of the
defensive strategy, which has ushered in a generation
of labour reforms that seek to make individual
employment contracts and labour conditions more
flexible by reducing exit costs and introducing new,
non-standard contracts as an alternative to the prevailing
open-ended contract. In addition, the reforms of the
individual contract are combined with the
decentralization of collective bargaining, particularly
in countries where negotiations are still conducted at a
level higher than the company, as a means to ensure
that wages are set according to productivity levels.
These reforms have resulted in increased flexibility
at the expense of greater instability and less protection.
The lack of protection is the consequence of both the
emergence of a large contingent of workers without
contracts and —although legislation did not eliminate
protections in the case of non-standard contracts— of
compliance with legal obligations that is, in practice,
lower. Employment instability, in turn, affected
incentives for investing in training and the developments
of worker skills. Both factors caused the defensive
strategy to run its course.
In response to the demise of the defensive strategy,
in the most developed countries and in large companies
4
 The cost of such indebtedness is high because of small enterprises’
limited access to capital markets, and it is further increased by rising
interest rates during adjustments.
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an alternative strategy emerged, which assigns priority
to raising productivity, to innovation and to learning.
The strategy requires investment in know-how, which
in turn requires a certain degree of employment
stability: employment instability does not provide
employers with an incentive to invest in training, since
they cannot be certain that they will reap the benefits
of future productivity gains, and workers lack
motivation to devote time and effort to learning, since
they realize that their employment is temporary. The
strategy also requires labour relations based on
cooperation more than on confrontation, which have a
greater chance of emerging in a framework of respect
for worker rights, of opportunities for dialogue and of
participation in the eventual benefits.
These strategic alternatives also affect incentives
for attracting foreign investment. In recent studies, the
OECD (2000) confirms that transnational capital moves
more in search of skilled workers and higher
productivity than of cheap labour, since low-wage
workers lack the capacity to ensure the quality of the
products they make. Obviously, each strategic option
has a different effect on employment, poverty and
degrees of equity.
The biggest challenge is to re-establish the balance
between stability and flexibility, so as to facilitate the
functioning of the economy in a context that requires
continuous adaptation but where workers need stability,
not only to diminish the uncertainty that affects them,
but, in addition, to help raise productivity. In labour
regulations, partly as a reaction to the excessive use of
defensive strategies, innovations have emerged that
attempt to balance needs for stability with needs for
flexibility.
The first innovation has been to limit the scope
of flexible contracts, reducing, in compensation, the
rigidity of open-ended contracts. This has been done
in a variety of ways: from legal limitations on the use
in non-standard contracts (Spain, 1997, and Argentina,
1998 and 2000), along with the simplification of the
judicial process for dismissals, in the first case, and
reducing the cost and extending the probationary
period, in the second, or placing conditions on the
scope of such contracts in collective bargaining
(Brazil, 1998).
In the Netherlands, another alternative has been
the introduction of more flexible, part-time contracts,
allowing the massive entry of women into the labour
market and the reduction of unemployment. However,
once a renewal period has elapsed, these contracts
acquire conditions of protection and stability similar
to those of long-term contracts. Moreover, the
differences between the conditions of part-time
contracts and those of customary contracts were
diminished through business organizations’ acceptance
of the reduction of the normal workweek to 35 hours
(Visser and Hemerijck, 1997). This modality has also
been incorporated into the recent reform in Chile,
although without agreement of the parties concerned.
Another alternative has been the introduction of
“negotiated flexibility”, by which workers and
employers agree on the characteristics and degrees of
flexibility and on the compensation that they consider
necessary. In some cases, the terms they agree to may
even replace terms of the labour legislation.
A second innovation consists in mitigating the risk
of unemployment through insurance. To this end,
unemployment insurance has been established that
attenuates, to an extent that varies from one country to
the next, the loss of income during periods of
unemployment. International experience shows that
insurance serves as a substitute for protection through
labour regulations: greater coverage of unemployment
insurance correlates with less protection at the
workplace.
Unemployment insurance was initially envisioned
for dealing with short-lived, mild cyclical
unemployment. It was designed to protect the income
of the least-skilled workers in standardized production
systems, families with a single income earner, and
centralized, collective bargaining that allows wage
structure compression. In addition, it was combined
with social welfare, to cover risks of lost work income
resulting from involuntary unemployment and to ensure
a minimum level of subsistence. This public social
security was justified by the consideration that
information asymmetries in the market did not allow
private insurance to operate efficiently.
Despite widespread adoption of unemployment
insurance in the most developed countries, reforms are
increasingly being introduced to make eligibility criteria
more stringent and reduce benefits, which has been
justified both with the need to reduce the potential
negative effects and with the amount of resources
needed to address the changing nature of
unemployment. Among the potential distortions in the
labour market linked to this insurance, we should
mention an “unemployment trap”, in which insurance
income discourages the jobless from seeking
employment, and a “poverty trap”, which discourages
low-wage employed workers from increasing their
efforts in their work. Both factors may increase the
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reserve wage and affect the equilibrium unemployment
rate.
Moreover, unemployment has risen to high levels,
its duration has increased and it affects less-educated
workers. Collective bargaining has increasingly
incorporated personalized wage incentives, which
introduce tension in criteria based on “equal pay for
equal work”, and households have gone from one
income earner to two. In the European Union countries,
average unemployment rates have reached 10%; half
the unemployed have been out of work for more than
one year; and half are located on the lower rungs of the
educational scale. In the United Kingdom, for example,
single-income households represented 70% of all
households in the early 1960s but declined to 30% in
the 1990s, while the proportion of two-income
households rose from 28% to 55%. In this context, with
a different type of unemployment, the need for resources
has multiplied, coverage periods have had to be
lengthened, and, for their part, families have created
their own self-insurance mechanisms by incorporating
secondary labour into the labour market (Buti, Frank
and Pench, 2000). Reforms in European countries have
focused on adjusting social policies to new demographic
and economic conditions and seeking alternative
systems, such as the transition from pay-as-you-go
pension systems to contributory systems, the
replacement of unemployment benefits with
employment subsidies and changes in the design of
social protection to increase its efficiency.
The coverage of unemployment insurance in
developing countries and, in particular, in Latin America
has been limited both by the structure of the labour
market as well as by the insufficiency of resources to
fund such insurance. Unemployment rates at times
reach significant levels and coexist with informal
employment that accounts for more than half of urban
employment. This means that grey areas are abundant.
Latin American countries generally devote a small
proportion of their resources to active and passive
labour policies. The share of GDP devoted to such
policies is one-seventh that of the European Union
countries and, unlike in the latter, a larger amount is
appropriated for active than for passive policies. On
average, the EU allocates 2.15% of GDP to financing
unemployment protection, whereas Brazil, the Latin
American country that devotes the most resources to
this item, earmarks 0.19%. Argentina, Brazil, Chile,
Ecuador, Uruguay and Venezuela have unemployment
insurance or social assistance. These countries’
insurance is contributory and is funded with tripartite
contributions (worker, employer and government). It
provides specific benefits, lasting between three and
twelve months. Some countries include the obligation
to receive training or accept job offers as a mechanism
to reduce moral hazard. Coverage in these countries
has been limited —in the years of the greatest use, it
has not surpassed 7% of the unemployed (Argentina in
1994)— and insurance has resisted adaptation to the
evolution of the cycle.
In addition to the negligible significance of
unemployment-protection mechanisms, labour
legislation has protected employment stability through
high severance payments and considerable exit costs
for cancelling labour contracts. An innovation within
this context, introduced in Brazil, Colombia, Panama
and Peru, has been to separate severance payments from
companies’ general reserves and to deposit them into
individual accounts in workers’ names. In some cases,
insurance can be used not only for receiving funds in
the event of dismissal but also to obtain advance
payments for housing or other needs up to a given
amount. Even when the cost of dismissals is not
affected, the availability of a progressively large amount
of resources makes decision-making easier and obviates
the labour conflicts often generated over severance-
payment collection (ILO, 2001).
The need to introduce greater flexibility in the
labour market so as to adapt to new demands has led,
as mentioned above, to reducing the cost of dismissing
workers and to limiting severance payments. This
process has not been accompanied by the expansion of
unemployment insurance or protection, which would
allow the equation to be balanced.
Nonetheless, the topic has gained ascendance on
the region’s labour agenda and today several countries
are exploring this path. The most recent case is Chile,
which in 2001 approved the creation of an
unemployment-insurance system that breaks ground
vis-à-vis current arrangements. It introduced a mixed
system consisting of mandatory savings in (worker-
owned) Individual Unemployment Accounts and a
Solidarity Fund that operates as complementary funding
for the payment of severance benefits. There is joint
responsibility, in the sense that workers must contribute
to the funding, and pressure on the solidarity component
is reduced by requiring that workers exhaust their own
funds before resorting to the Solidarity Fund. Funding
is provided workers (0.6%), employers (2.4%, including
1.6% earmarked to the individual account and the rest
to the Fund) and the public treasury (there is a
complementary fiscal contribution). The arrangement
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is innovative because workers may receive funds
accumulated not only in the event of dismissal but also
in the event of voluntary resignation, thereby creating
an incentive for voluntary mobility; moreover, workers
are not penalized with the loss of their accumulated
funds. The cost of severance payments is reduced by
counting employer contributions into individual
severance accounts against such payments. Another
pioneering element of the arrangement is the
coexistence of a solidarity component for workers
unable to save enough funds to qualify for the minimum
level of unemployment benefits; and, lastly, its
management is innovative, in that it introduces a single
private operator to manage accumulated funds, rather
than the usual multiple operators who specialize in
managing specific risks.
5. Social protection for unemployment
compensation
Once the employment risk becomes a reality, the
unemployed must receive compensation through labour
and social policies. The available instruments are
generally publicly supported job creation programmes,
subsidies on hiring, training and cash transfers.
Job creation programmes are carried out directly
by the public sector or through the private sector,
whereas subsidies are transferred to the private sector,
in response to the perception that the cost of hiring is at
a level that impedes hiring. Training operates by
reinforcing or adapting workers’ employability, and
transfers compensate for the lack of income of the
poorest families.
Direct job creation with public support has proven
to be one of the tools receiving the best evaluations,
because of its rapid effect on unemployment and
because it constitutes an appropriate vehicle for
expressing political will to deal with unemployment.
Still, jobs of this type face a series of limitations.
Expanding job-creation programmes has proven
difficult because of the high resource requirements.
International experience shows that government
support for such jobs does not exceed between 2% to
3% of GDP. These programmes tend to be procyclical,
since when more jobs need to be created, there are
greater limitations on fiscal resources. Moreover, they
are envisioned as temporary, yet they tend to
perpetuate because of the spread of clientelism. Lastly,
these programmes are of limited economic efficacy,
because of “leakages” in their execution: only one of
every three dollars allocated reaches beneficiaries
(Hicks and Wodon, 2000; Holzmann and Jorgensen,
1999).
Training programmes also receive favourable
evaluations because they help workers adapt to new
needs, and because they facilitate the entry of young
workers into the labour market. Hiring subsidies may
play an important role, particularly because they transfer
the responsibility of hiring to employers, thereby
reducing clientelism, and because they generate longer-
term employment for at least some of the beneficiaries,
who continue on the job once the subsidy has run out.
There is, however, a risk that in economic downturns
these subsidies will be used to formalize a relationship
with non-contracted workers already employed at a
company, thereby reducing the contribution to job
creation, and that in upturns they will prove redundant,
because the hiring might have taken place even with
unsubsidized wages.
Measures taken in response to unemployment are
designed more to hedge risk than to mitigate poverty.
Even so, addressing unemployment in countries that
lack insurance with satisfactory coverage and where
households still depend to a significant degree on the
income of the head of household does contribute to
mitigating poverty. From a standpoint of economic
efficiency, government intervention aimed at providing
social security to cover risks that private insurance
cannot cover is fully justified because of the weaknesses
present in this type of market. The existence of adverse
selection and moral hazard constitutes an argument
against private insurance, as does the difficulty of
predicting the number of winners and losers in given
periods or the probabilities that the risks being insured
against will materialize.
Social security with universal coverage may also
have important cost advantages over insurance based
on private competition. Since private insurance is
generally premised on establishing individual risk
premiums, social security may include redistributive
elements between good and bad risks, or subsidies
between insureds with different payment capacities.
This is important, given the recent trend of mixed
insurance models in pensions as well as in health.
Although recent social security reforms seek to
strengthen complementarities between public and
private systems, at the same time they permit the
coexistence of different logics —and, in the case of
health, of different qualities of service— which segment
the covered population and limit cross-subsidization
between rich and poor. One system operates according
to market logic and attends to the population with the
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ability to pay. The lowest-income population is
excluded and must be covered by the public sector,
through general fiscal resources rather than with the
transfers that could be made among insureds or from
current to future insureds, in the case of pensions. As
social security benefits become entitlements, they also
turn into contingent liabilities and generate fiscal
obligations. In Chile, Titelman and Uthoff (2002)
project an increase in the current fiscal deficit to cover
minimum and welfare pensions from 0.4% to 1.5% of
GDP once the present generations retire. Also in Chile,
Arenas de Mesa and Hernández (2002) calculate that,
to cover the value of minimum pensions, the fiscal
deficit will increase from the current 0.1% to 1.3% of
GDP by 2037. The estimated deficit depends on
demographic factors, on the percentage of the active
population covered, on replacement rates and on
required contributions. In Bolivia the current shortfall
is estimated at 2.3% of GDP, and in countries such as
Mexico and El Salvador it is estimated at approximately
1.8% (Titelman and Uthoff, 2002). The magnitude of
the unfunded fiscal responsibility leads these authors
to recommend maintaining a redistributive public pillar
that will make it possible to contribute to offsetting the
disequilibria and mitigating future fiscal crises.
In some cases, the public sector’s participation as
a provider in mixed systems becomes necessary, but in
all cases it is needed as guarantor of systemic solidarity.
This implies recognizing social security as a right whose
access must be guaranteed for the entire population.
However, contrary to the vision prevailing until a few
decades ago, coverage should expand gradually, to
reconcile benefits with countries’ real financial
possibilities. Mixed systems are also promoted for
reasons of economic efficiency in benefits and resource
management. At the same time there needs to be a single
system for all, and the State must assume the
responsibility of ensuring that this will be respected.
Minimum pensions need to be provided to persons who
did not attain a sufficient density of contributions during
their working lives, and in health, those whose income
level precluded them from financing their stages of
greater risk (whether from age or catastrophic illnesses)
must be protected. At the same time, similar qualities
of benefits, defined independent from the provider or
user in question, must be ensured. There is, then, a
responsibility to properly regulate social security
beyond mere financial responsibility.
Lastly, when social spending especially targeting
the poor is required to act as a complement of self-
insurance and as a substitute for market insurance, it
should behave countercyclically. In recessions, when
saving is hindered or market insurance cannot cover
the broad effects of the contraction, the expansion of
social spending, particularly targeted social spending,
should play that countercyclical role.
Experience shows that this is not easy to do. Even
when social spending increases in phases of economic
growth, during downturns social spending per poor
person tends to decline. This underscores a dual policy
task. First, it is important to control pressure in favour
of expanding outlays in growth periods, because such
pressure undermines the possibility of maintaining
spending in the long term. Second, in the downturn it
is necessary to protect or “shield” targeted spending,
since the effect of economic contraction is reinforced
with the increased number of poor requiring
assistance.
In general, we observe more appropriate behaviour
vis-à-vis risk by poor households than by governments.
Households tend to boost self-insurance, saving both
in good times and in tighter periods. When recessions
are brief or mild and are perceived as transitory,
households resort to assets such as family labour to
offset declining income. Only in deep, long recessions
do they drastically cut back investment in health and
education. Governments, by contrast, are hard-pressed
to apply such a policy, not because of a lack of
information or expertise but because of the interaction
of political and economic restrictions that hamper the
establishment of reserves in boom periods with which
to weather periods of crisis. Some options to which
governments can resort include introducing an
insurance component to cover risks such as
unemployment and social security, or borrowing on
financial markets in downturns and repaying in good
periods. Unfortunately, as we saw above, the current
times are not propitious to the availability of funds for
such purposes, since capitals markets also behave
procyclically. Therefore, designing a well-conceived
and funded national system is, in fact, the only policy
alternative.
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The current functioning of the economy is associated
with an increase in instability and in the risks to be
managed by individuals and their families. The effect
transcends individual levels and is transferred to society
as a whole. Tensions thereby rise, because employment
as well as income instability generates uncertainty and
because the dynamic and degree of social cohesion are
altered. This section will focus on two dimensions of
the problem. First, these factors affect the process of
social homogenization, which in the past has been the
vehicle for achieving individual and family progress in
a context of greater cohesion. Moreover, they also affect
the mechanisms that determine the possibilities of
avoiding an intergenerational transmission of poverty.
1. Labour mobility and homogenization
In the past, homogenization took place through upward
mobility and, in particular, through the growth of the
middle groups. In the current economic setting,
however, it is these groups that have borne the brunt of
changing labour markets and social policy.
Middle groups were affected by government
downsizing, which left many of their members
unemployed. For those who managed to re-enter the
labour market in the private sector, the transition from
one sector to another meant trading permanent,
protected jobs affording stability and protection for less
stable jobs with less protection, although not necessarily
a lower income. Those who kept their government
employment saw a reduction in their wages and a
decline in their status, given the ideological depreciation
suffered by the civil service.
As public employees they had, moreover, enjoyed
social protection as part of their employment. Along
with other middle groups, they had been the main
beneficiaries of universal and free access to public
goods and services. With the loss of employment came
a loss of protection, and the privatization of public
services also entailed paying for such services. It is not
surprising, then, that middle groups have been harmed
the most by the changing income distribution during
the two last decades.
To a certain extent, such a decline is inherent to
the logic according to which the new model, based on
privatization, operates, with the consequent effects on
public employment and on the provision of public goods
and services. The objective, then, is to contribute to
macroeconomic equilibria in fiscal matters and in prices
and, at the same time, to increase economic and
distributive efficacy in the allocation of social spending.
The result should be faster growth and less poverty. In
successful countries, this has been the case, but the cost
has been borne by the middle groups. This is because
income transfers take place between those groups and
the poor, since the higher-income groups are “protected”
to avoid harming their productive capacity.
The results have been more efficient governments,
more balanced economies, a more efficacious allocation
of social spending, and a decrease in the number of
poor; but also a less equal income distribution and a
society in which the gaps between rich and poor are
not decreasing and social integration is hampered.
2. Intergenerational transmission of poverty
Related to poverty are the mechanisms by which
poverty is transmitted between generations. Poor
families suffer unemployment to a greater extent than
do wealthy ones; fewer of their members participate in
the labour market; and, therefore, they are more exposed
to the risk of a loss of income. Even in successful
experiences of job growth, poverty diminishes but
access to new jobs is discriminatory. Greater
employment opportunities for poor families come
entirely from informal jobs, whereas for the higher-
income strata formal positions predominate. Informal
jobs have few educational and skills requirements, while
formal positions generally require university or
technical studies. Children belonging to poor
households exhibit a higher rate of illiteracy and fewer
years of schooling; and, despite the expansion of
educational coverage, there continue to be large
differences between the quality of the schools attended
by them and those attended by their peers from higher-
income families. This disparity has even been magnified
by the growing segmentation into state and private
schools in which the latter, because of the type of
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A vicious circle is thus created in which the
inequality of opportunities skews access to
employment. Young people from poor households,
with a greater need for income and less human
capital, enter the labour market prematurely. Those
who find work are mainly employed in positions with
lower productivity and income and with few
prospects for developing a career. Consequently,
poverty tends be transmitted from one generation to
the next. Ensuring universal access to education and
training, compensating for the additional family
income that might be lost when individuals do not
enter the labour market, and reducing differences in
the quality of education are requirements for creating
more equitable opportunities of access to
employment.
VII
Towards a comprehensive vision
for dealing with risk and instability
This study has analysed possible responses, at different
levels, to situations of instability and high risk. For a
comprehensive vision of how to address such situations
we need to review, from a historic and paradigmatic
perspective, the various systems that have been used
for that purpose.
The most widespread social-protection model
during much of the twentieth century dovetailed with a
Keynesian conception of full employment and the
creation of the welfare state. In a closed economy, full
employment regulated by domestic demand made
employment the main source of income. Jobs were
stable and protected by labour legislation intended to
ensure both employment stability, with contractual
conditions that made dismissals expensive, as well as a
balance in negotiation powers between workers and
employers. For those who only managed an imperfect
participation in the labour market, the welfare state
incorporated systemic social protection aimed at
shielding workers at different stages of their lives (in
old age, through pensions) and vis-à-vis risks during
their working lives (unemployment, disability, accidents
and death). In particular, unemployment insurance was
introduced to protect active workers who became
unemployed. Given the general model according to
which the economy operated, the loss of employment
could only be temporary and, in general, affect a small
proportion of workers. The objective of this insurance
was, then, to cover those who were exposed to a risk
with a low probability of occurrence and limited effects
(Standing, 2000; Buti, Franco and Pench, 2000).
This model of social protection operated in much
of the developed world, although with different
nuances, which translated, in particular, into different
combinations of labour regulations and unemployment
insurance; as well as into the orientation of protection
outside the workplace: focus on non-working ages (the
young and old) or on the working life, both to
compensate for the loss of employment (insurance) and
to shorten the waiting time between one job and the
next (active policies). The model did this successfully,
achieving not only security but a harmonic social
development in keeping with cohesion and equilibrium
in social relations. It was also a source of inspiration
for most Latin American countries that, although
imperfectly, advanced under the same guidelines.
However, the final decades of the twentieth century
demonstrated the flaws of the system, including in
developed countries, which led to its questioning and
to the beginning of successive reforms. This questioning
became more pronounced with the change in the
economic system and, indeed, with the abandonment
of the objective of full employment, compounded by
the need for flexibilization to operate in more volatile
markets and the financial difficulties of covering more
unemployed, and for longer periods, than originally
foreseen. The reforms in European countries, contrary
to what is often stated, have led not to a dismantling of
the system but to its re-examination with a view to
reducing benefits, tightening the eligibility criteria and
introducing additional criteria to shorten employment-
search periods.
Latin American countries once again followed the
evolution of the developed countries, but magnifying
both the problems and the solutions. The original
design could be incorporated only imperfectly,
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because, although the low unemployment levels in
the region could be considered consistent with a
full-employment equilibrium, the prevailing
underemployment was of a large magnitude and long
standing. Indeed, protection for the unemployed means
a differentiation with the underemployed that is not
only arbitrary but also ineffective in terms of income
compensation. Similarly, funding difficulties mean
that protection is focused on employment stability and
that it covers unemployment, with limited coverage,
in only a few countries. This has not prevented the
welfare state from being questioned even more
intensely than in Europe. The shift in the orientation
of the economic model towards openness and
integration into the international economy —which took
place over a very short period and was accompanied
by macroeconomic policies inspired in the Washington
Consensus and aimed at achieving external account
and price equilibrium— transfers the demand for
flexibility to the labour markets, thereby magnifying
insecurity.
The labour reforms that have been introduced have
brought greater instability and a lack of protection in
the workplace; hence, social protection (including
unemployment insurance) faces an impossible task in
a framework of financial restriction. In this context,
the questioning has intensified, and the search for full
employment and for systemic social protection has been
bypassed, though not always explicitly. In short, the
welfare state has been forsaken. However, no alternative
to replace it has emerged.
How are we to deal with the situation? Although
completely answering this question is beyond the
possibilities of this study, I would like to make six
observations to contribute to the discussion.
First is the recognition that we cannot address the
current situation with nostalgia for the past. Returning
to the past is neither viable nor desirable. It is not in the
interest of Latin American countries to once again close
their economies or to put a straightjacket on their
markets—nor could they do so.
Second, I suggest reaffirming full employment as
an objective. This proposal might be considered
prescriptive and unrealistic, but it may contribute to
strengthening the political will to pursue such an
objective, which is an initial step to committing to
devising policies to this end. Moreover, it establishes a
social obligation vis-à-vis this objective that entails
responsibilities shared by government and society as a
whole, particularly employers.
Third, I suggest revising the concept of full
employment to include the new types of employment
that have emerged. No longer should this concept solely
be associated with stable employment and permanent
protection but it should also include occupations that,
although less stable and affording less protection, are
able to provide sufficient income for dealing with the
greater risks that they entail. However, steps must be
taken to ensure that these occupations comply at least
with minimum quality requirements regarding
fundamental labour rights and labour conditions.
Fourth, the strategy of dealing with risk and
instability once persons and families have been affected
is an implicit acceptance that little can be done to
modify the magnitude of the risk; in addition, it strains
the tasks of protection and insurance, making them very
difficult to address. The idea is to reduce risk, first by
acting on the levels closest to the source of instability
that offer possibilities for influencing results. Adopting
policies aimed at diminishing volatility from the
outside, countercyclical macroeconomic policies and
more suitable microeconomic policies would make it
possible to contribute to risk reduction.
Fifth, the way in which progress towards market
flexibility is made, particularly in the labour market, is
also crucial because it determines the degree of
instability and risk to be dealt with by workers and their
families. Labour reforms that seek flexibilization, either
by making it easier to dismiss workers or by eliminating
protections, increase the demands for protection outside
the labour market. Therefore, reconciling flexibilization
with protection would diminish the need for
unemployment insurance, and, at the same time,
contribute to the creation of new jobs.
Lastly, protection systems that permit universal
basic minimums to be guaranteed should be established.
This might be done in a variety of ways: income
transfers, unemployment insurance or other
occupational hazard insurance. The effectiveness of
pension and health-care coverage should also be
examined. There is a public responsibility to ensure
broad coverage, but, given the public-private nature of
most of those systems today, it is becoming necessary
to examine the two components as a whole so as to
ensure universal coverage and the necessary solidarity
for such coverage to be affordable.
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